In the papers [1, 2] a new scheme to produce public key agreement (PKA) algorithms was proposed and some examples based on polynomials (toy models) were discussed. In the present paper we introduce a non-commutative realization of the above mentioned scheme and prove that non-commutativity can be an essential ingredient of security in the sense that, in the class of algorithms constructed, under some commutativity assumptions on the matrices involved, we can nd a breaking strategy, but dropping these assumptions we can not, even if we assume, as we do in all the attacks discussed in the present paper, that discrete logarithms have zero cost. 
Public key agreement (PKA) algorithms play an important role in contemporary asymmetric cryptography. The term asymmetry here refers to the di erence of information between sender and receiver: each of them ignores the secret key of the other one. However, in the most used asymmetric algorithms the operations executed by sender and receiver are very similar. The main idea of strongly asymmetric cryptography is to further break this symmetry introducing multiple secret and public keys for the sender. This allows to split public information into several pieces, thus making attacks more di cult.
In the present paper we will keep the distinction between public parameters and public keys even if in PKA algorithms this distinction is not sharp because any public parameter can become a public key of one of the interlocutors.
. Public parameters
The public parameters of the algorithm are • a natural integer ∈ ℕ, • a large prime number ∈ ℕ, • the nite eld (typically := ℤ ), • a xed matrix ∈ ( ; ) := { × square matrices with entries in }, • a nite set ⊂ ℕ.
In the following, all scalar multiplications (in particular exponentiations) are meant in and we use the convention 0 := 0 for all ∈ .
The term matrix will be used as a synonym of element of ( ; ); all matrix multiplications are meant in the standard sense while matrix exponentiations are meant in the Schur sense, i.e. elementwise: if is either an element of or a matrix = ( ) and = ( , ) is a matrix, the symbol ∘ denotes the matrix 
Secret keys of . The main secret key of is
,3 ∈ ( ; ).
Additional secret keys of are ∈ ( ; ) : ∈ , ,3 ∈ ( ; ), ∈ .
The conditions to be satis ed by these secret keys of are
Here and in the following, if ≡ ( ) ∈ ( ; ), then log denotes the Schur logarithm of , i.e.
(log ) := log .
Clearly, ,3 must be invertible and, for the reasons explained in Section 1.4, it is convenient to choose the non-invertible.
Public keys of . The public keys of are given by the nite set of matrices ,2; , ,3; ∈ ( ; ) : ∈ , constructed using the secret keys of , as follows. For all ∈ and , ∈ {1, . . . , } set
, .
Notice that, once given the ( ) ∈ and any matrix ∈ ( ; ), the polynomial ≡ ( ) ∈ ,
of degree | | in the matrix ∘ is uniquely determined.
Secret key of . A matrix ∈ ( ; ).
Public key of . The public key of is given by the matrix := ( ; , ) ∈ ( ; ) constructed as follows. For each , ∈ {1, . . . , } set
, . can be computed uniquely in terms of the public keys of , the public parameter and the secret key of as follows. For each , ∈ {1, . . . , },
, , , ∈ {1, . . . , }.
computes the SSK using the public key of and his own secret keys.
First step. uses his secret key ,3 to clean the noise, calculating, for each , ∈ {1, . . . , }, ∈{1,..., } ; , (
Second step. inserts his main secret key, calculating, for each , ∈ {1, . . . , },
computes the SSK using the public key of and her own secret key, and calculating, for each , ∈ {1, . . . , },
Since (1) implies ,3 ( ∘ ) = ( ∘ ) ,3 for each ∈ , this becomes equal to
. Attacks
The eavesdropper knows the following: (i) the public parameters:
(ii) the public keys of :
(iii) the structure of the public keys of :
, , ∈ , , ∈ {1, . . . , },
, ,
(iv) the public key of :
the constraints (1).
wants to know the SSK:
Assuming zero cost logarithms, can compute for each , ∈ {1, . . . , } log ,2; ; , = ( ,3 ) , log , ∈ , log ,3; ; , = ( ,3 ) , log , ∈ ,
In addition knows that the logarithm of the SSK is
This gives the following matrix equations:
log ,3; = ,3 log , ∈ ,
knows that ,3 is invertible and, even not knowing
,3 , knows from (7) that
,3 log = ( ∘ ) log must hold. From this and (8), even not knowing log , knows that the following relation must hold:
. Solutions of the system (5), (6), (9)
In order to study the system (5), (6), (9), let us introduce the simplifying notations
for the unknowns to , and
for the known matrices. Then the system (5), (6), (9) becomes equivalent to the system
Since no appears in equation (16), the only possibility to solve the system (14), (15), (16) 
Hence, using (17), (18) 
Therefore, if knows 1 , then she knows log , hence the SSK .
Second attack. may deduce 1 from (14) obtaining
Then, using (18) and the invertibility of 2,1 , she nds
and from this she deduces log = ,3
Third attack. From (5) and (6), if 1 is invertible, obtains (log ,2;1 ) −1 (log )(log ,3;1 ) = ( ,3 1 log ) −1 (log )( 1 ,3 log ) = ( 1 log )
Equivalently, in the notations (10), (11), (12), (13):
Fourth attack. From (21) it follows that, if hence can express the key in terms of the public parameters:
,3 (log ) = log .
In conclusion: if in addition to the invertibility of 1 we also suppose that condition (3) is not satis ed, i.e. that
,3 log ] = 0, and that (2) holds, then can reconstruct the SSK.
Fifth attack. From (5) and (6), if 1 is invertible, obtains (log ,3;1 )(log )(log ,2;1 ) −1 = ( 1 ,3 log )(log )( ,3 1 log )
or, equivalently, (log ,3;1 )(log )(log ,2;1 )
then the above identity is equivalent to (log ,3;1 )(log )(log ,2;1 )
Comparing this with (9), we see that, if in addition to
then can express the SSK in terms of the public parameters:
(log ,3;1 )(log )(log ,2;1 )
Sixth attack. Suppose that the ,2; are invertible, so that can form the product (log ,2; ) −1 (log ,3; ) = (log )
If is a scalar, this is equivalent to (log ,2; ) −1 (log ,3; ) =
So can compute (log ,2; ) −1 (log ,3; ) log =
,3 log .
this expression can be simpli ed obtaining
Comparing this with (9), we see that, if in addition to (23) one has
(log ,2; ) −1 (log ,3; ) log = ,3 −1 ,3 log = log . or, equivalently, in view of (10), (11), (12), (13), log = log ,3,1 (log ,2,1 ) −1 log , which expresses the SSK in terms of the public parameters.
. The role of commutativity
In conclusion: if in addition to the invertibility of 1 we also suppose that condition (4) is not satis ed, i.e. that [log ,3;1
then can reconstruct the SSK. or, equivalently, in view of (10), (11), (12), (13), log = (log ,2,1 ) −1 log ,3,1 log , which again expresses the SSK in terms of the public parameters.
In conclusion: if in addition to the invertibility of 1 we also suppose that condition (4) is not satis ed, i.e. that [log ,3;1 , ] = 0,
then can reconstruct the SSK.
Remark. Notice that the conditions (24) and (25) are always satis ed in the one-dimensional case.
. Attacks under strong invertibility conditions
In the present section we suppose that the (equivalently all the ) are invertible for each ∈ . Moreover, we x, as always possible, a numeration of which identi es it with a set of the form ≡ {1, . . . , }. Then equations (14), (15) become, respectively, 2,
3,
Equation (26) implies in particular that
If 22 is invertible, we deduce from 
Then from 2,
we deduce that
1 . Therefore, by induction (28) holds for each ∈ .
From the same argument, with 2, replaced by 3, , we deduce that
Combining (28) and (29), we obtain the system of | |−1 homogeneous linear equations in the unknown matrix
Remark. We know a priori that at least one matrix solution of the system (30) exists. However, if | | < 2 + 1, 
. Computational complexity
Computation of .
• Computation of ∘ : --scalar: log matrix multiplications: each matrix multiplication, 3 scalar multiplications.
--matrix: 2 scalar exponentiations.
• Computation of ( ∘ ) (no di erence between -scalar or -matrix): log matrix multiplications for each ∈ {1, . . . , | |}.
Total number of matrix multiplications:
| | =1 log = log(| |!) ∼ | | log | |.
In conclusion, we have (log + | | log | |) 3 multiplications.
Number of exponentiations:
4 .
Multiplications for each entry of : | | ⋅ . In total, we have 2 ((log + | | log | |) 3 + | | ) multiplications to produce , plus 4 exponentiations.
The complexity of the number of exponentiations is of order log , where is the exponent. This gives (log ) 4 multiplications.
Computation of ,2 . One matrix multiplication, i.e. 3 multiplications, and 2 exponentiations, i.e. an order of 2 log multiplications.
In total, we have 3 + 2 log multiplications.
Computation of ,3 . The same order of complexity as ,2 .
